Open-Source Intelligence & Sanctions Compliance Registry
English-language satellite of GRU cartel channel @ZeRada1 (zeglobal@protonmail.com) targeting Western audiences.
Observed in Target Threads: 85th GTSSS GRU Telegram Cartel (@ZeRada1 English clone)
- ZeRada Global (@zeradaglobal) - English-language satellite of GRU cartel channel @ZeRada1 (zeglobal@protonmail.com) targeting Western audiences.
[CRITERION 1 — Russian Botfarm Symbiosis & Selective Moderation]: systematic amplification by industrial Russian botfarms (ru-RU locale YouTube bots with Cyrillic hard-sign/yeru suffixes, Latin-Cyrillic homoglyph farms, .XXXXXX & id=615... batch autoregs, Russian regional profiles) combined with rapid deletion/blocking of factual comments while preserving Russian bots at the top of threads.
[CRITERION 2 — Synchronized Russian State Media Syndication]: rapid syndication (within 15–120 minutes) across Russian federal state outlets (TASS, RIA Novosti, Ukraina.ru / Rossiya Segodnya, Lenta.ru, Topwar.ru).
Every record is documented via archival profile/subscription extracts, numeric Facebook UID, or Russian ru-RU locale Cyrillic hard-sign/yeru handle suffixes
Select a Russian weapon system to expand its 4-tier industrial supply chain (from prime design bureaus and propulsion to seekers, microelectronics, solid propellants, and explosives) with official registry executive contacts
Despite entity-level designations, 77.1% of executive & engineering leadership (297 of 385 general directors, chief engineers, and technical directors) and 14 upstream & component defense plants remain OUTSIDE personal or direct US, EU, and UK sanctions lists
+7 9...), Sberbank/VTB/T-Bank/PSB card numbers, recipient identities, and contact Telegram @handles listed below were published directly by Russian military bloggers, Z-channel administrators, and UAV/EW procurement fundraisers in their own public posts and channel descriptions (t.me/s/...).Direct Russian SBP mobile numbers, bank recipient details, and contact Telegram @handles from public crowdfunding posts for UAVs, EW systems, optics, and tactical comms
Systematization of cover stories ("water carriers / cooks / locksmiths") and engineering, medical, and tactical inconsistencies in open interviews
Experienced contract personnel tailor their answers not for Ukrainian viewers, but for post-exchange FSB Military Counterintelligence interrogation at Mosrentgen: attributing technical/defense details to "engineers", avoiding war-crime admissions, and recording on camera that they ran out of ammunition and were captured by surprise.
Non-engineering interviewers miss technical contradictions in civilian cover stories: when a subject claims 9th-grade manual labor yet travels on industrial commissioning deployments for 50-meter production lines while reciting physical impossibilities about metallurgical or defense machinery.
The POW claims 30-km foot marches hauling heavy water and ration packs, yet admits in the same interview to a severed arm artery with post-surgical contracture, a punctured lung, and spinal disc herniation—conditions clinically incompatible with heavy porter duty.
To conceal military academy or technical university enrollment between ages 17 and 21, the operative fabricates a 3.5-year juvenile prison sentence—yet fails to recall the basic reason for his alleged first arrest.
Relatives on live phone calls do not know the cover story just told in the studio and expose reality within seconds: dug-in forward observation/hideout duty ("sitting buried on drops of water"), missing bank payouts, or sensitive contact names whom the POW abruptly silences.
An alleged untrained "water carrier" who claims to have fired a rifle twice on a range accurately identifies Ukrainian SOF weapon optics (side-mounted thermal sight + red-dot collimator) within a 3-second forest firefight and details neighboring GRU brigade tactics.
UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OPEN DATA (UO.XML & FOP.XML OF 2026-10-27), PROZORRO & UA NSDC SANCTIONS REGISTRY (NBU AML RESOLUTION NO. 65 / LAW NO. 1644-VII / UN CHARTER ART. 51): This section documents two structural corporate-registry and sanctions-compliance gaps across 382 100%-verified subjects (30 Tier-1 full dossiers + 352 Tier-2 consolidated registry records): (1) individuals matched via verified phones, corporate e-mails, and Tax IDs from the May 2014 “DPR” armed militant recruitment archive remain active owners, directors, and sole proprietors in Ukraine’s Unified State Register (including brand-new 2026 Kyiv companies, Prozorro public-procurement contractors, registered print media, construction, and security firms) without NSDC sanctions; (2) Russian billionaires and citizens under active 10-year Ukrainian NSDC and EU sanctions (including Svetofor / Mere, TechnoNICOL, and ex-Severstal) remain recorded as active Ultimate Beneficial Owners of unliquidated Ukrainian companies in live UO.xml.
Tier 1 (30 full SSR dossiers covering operating LLCs, Prozorro public-procurement contractors, and NSDC/EU-sanctioned Russian UBOs) + Tier 2 (352 compact FOP & corporate UBO records for rapid AML/KYC screening)
Without automated cross-mapping against live Ministry of Justice datasets (UO.xml and FOP.xml), compliance teams miss both long-running companies of 2014 militant applicants and brand-new LLCs and FOPs incorporated in April–September 2026 alongside Prozorro municipal contractors.
All surname/patronymic-only collisions were discarded. Every record is anchored by an independent secondary identifier: exact contact phone match in live EDR or Prozorro contracts (+380660824727, +380977788114, +380505656633), corporate e-mail (tne@ukr.net = LLC ‘T.N.E.’), or National Media Council Decision No. 1159 (R30-01797).
Direct parsing of <FOUNDER> and <BENEFICIARY> tags in the 2026-10-27 UO.xml snapshot exposed active Ukrainian companies totaling UAH 2.39B in Tier 1 and over UAH 26.7B across all 300 verified subjects, including entities linked to Rosatom (JSC TVEL), Rostec (Technopromexport), AFK Sistema, Svetofor / Mere, Guta Group, and January 2026 wartime registrations.
To preserve investigative clarity, 30 high-impact corporate and sanctioned-UBO cases are published as full forensic SSR dossiers (Tier 1), while 352 additional verified FOPs and corporate UBOs are consolidated into a searchable reference table below (Tier 2) and exported in /edr.json.
1) May 2014 Militant Network (22 subjects: 7 in Tier 1 + 15 in Tier 2): direct primary attribution to the Myrotvorets Center Database (myrotvorets.center) and the intercepted ‘DPR’ Mobilization Directorate / ‘Vostok’ Battalion archive (#4500idiotov, May 2014) with verbatim “How I can help DPR” pledges, TSV row numbers, phones, and e-mails; 2) Corporate & UBO Registry Layer (278 RF-capital subjects + all 300 records): official open-data dump of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine (UO.xml and FOP.xml as of 2026-10-27) and Prozorro (prozorro.gov.ua); 3) Sanctions Layer: Ukraine NSDC State Register of Sanctions (drs.nsdc.gov.ua), EU (EUR-Lex), US (OFAC SDN), UK, Canada, Poland, and OpenSanctions.
Compact searchable & filterable AML/KYC screening table across 25 regions of Ukraine: 15 active FOP & LLC records matched to the Myrotvorets Center Database / #4500idiotov (2014) + 27 NSDC/EU/OFAC-sanctioned RF subjects + 233 active companies with direct Russian corporate/UBO capital in live UO.xml (2026-10-27)
| # | Subject & Region | Category & Source | Primary Record (Myrotvorets / Sanctions / UO.xml) | Active Status in Ukraine's EDR (UO.xml / FOP.xml · 2026-10-27) |
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Registry update chronicle and documented episodes of statement syndication across Russian federal state outlets (TASS, RIA Novosti, Ukraina.ru, Lenta.ru)
Documented episodes of public statements by Ukrainian speakers leveraged in Russian state information operations
Structural topology of 6 Russian botfarm clusters, cross-thread shared accounts across profiled speakers, and Russian state media syndication
Publication of narratives targeting defense programs, mobilization, or institutional legitimacy on the speaker’s Facebook, YouTube, or Telegram channel.
Industrial Russian bot networks (ru-RU hard-sign suffixes, homoglyphs, 615..., Russian regional profiles) flood the thread. Page moderation rapidly deletes factual comments while preserving Russian bots at the top of the thread.
Within 15–120 minutes, the speaker’s statement is syndicated across Russian federal state media (MIA Rossiya Segodnya, TASS, Lenta.ru, Topwar.ru).