OPERBAZA.ORG · OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE & SANCTIONS COMPLIANCE REGISTRY · VERIFIED PRIMARY REGISTRIES & DOCUMENTARY ARCHIVES
OB
OPERBAZA.ORG OSINT / COMPLIANCE REGISTRY

Open-Source Intelligence & Sanctions Compliance Registry

UA EN
['AIRFIELD GUARD FOR 0 RUB' RECRUITMENT FRAUD & GAS-PIPE ASSAULT] (2,521 TIMECODED LINES) · 9TH ASSAULT COMPANY, UNIT 31132 (BOHUSLAVKA) · Dmytro Karpenko ('Apostle' / @ApostleDmytroKarpenko)

Vladislav Sergeyevich (b. 15.10.1999) (Bolshakovo settlement, Slavsky District, Kaliningrad Oblast, RF)

Interviewer & Source: Dmytro Karpenko ('Apostle' / @ApostleDmytroKarpenko) (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rNA96Jx6Tqg)
Russian Military Unit: 9th Assault Company, Military Unit 31132 (2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division / 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow MD, Kupyansk-Borova axis, Bohuslavka); prior conscript service (2019–2020) — designated sniper, Sniper Company, 336th Separate Guards Naval Infantry Brigade, Baltic Fleet (Unit 06017, Baltiysk); alumnus of Andrew the First-Called Naval Cadet Corps (FNS TIN 3904040429, Kaliningrad)
Claimed On-Camera Cover Story: Poses as a 'gentle anti-Putin IT networking graduate and follower of Navalny, Katz, and Davankov' who after naval cadet school, computer-networks college, and Baltic Fleet marine service worked as a postman and warehouse picker (Ozon, Perekrestok, Farmservis, Tula Unilever ice-cream plant), naively answered an RF MoD ad on 22.10.2025 for 'rear-area airfield guard duty at RUB 2M' to clear RUB 300,000+ in microloan debts, received zero rubles, and was shoved without maps into an underground gas pipeline near Bohuslavka where mud clogged his rifle barrel before a Ukrainian Mavic drone led him into captivity.
Assessed Real Operational Profile: Alumnus of Kaliningrad's Andrew the First-Called Naval Cadet Corps (FNS TIN 3904040429) and former designated SVD/SVDS sniper of the Sniper Company, 336th Separate Guards Naval Infantry Brigade, Baltic Fleet (Military Unit 06017, Baltiysk), who signed an RF MoD contract on 22.10.2025 after contractor layoffs at the nationalized Tula Unilever / Arnest UniRus ice-cream factory (FNS TIN 7705183476) and RUB 300,000+ in predatory microloan debt. Paid RUB 0 of his promised RUB 2M bonus, he was deployed in the lead 5-man assault element carrying an offline `AlpineQuest` tactical smartphone navigator during a 60-man underground gas-pipeline infiltration toward Bohuslavka (Izium District, Kharkiv Oblast), surrendering to an AFU Mavic drone on 25.11.2025 after 96–98% of the pipe force was wiped out.
Verified Deception & Technical/Medical Contradictions:
  • 120-Second Self-Exposure Over Tactical `AlpineQuest` Smartphone Navigation ([01:01:26] vs [01:03:38] & [01:04:10]): Swears at [01:01:26] that 'there was no internet and no maps there at all', then two minutes later slips twice that after exiting the gas pipe in the first five-man team he advanced solo using Russia's military offline smartphone navigator: 'I moved further along the route on Alpine [AlpineQuest]... my radio was dead, I navigated by Alpine.'
  • Deliberate Military Incompetence Simulation by a Naval Cadet & 336th Marine Brigade Sniper ([17:23]–[18:32], [01:03:38]–[01:04:15]): Despite 3 years of naval cadet school and a full year as a designated SVD/SVDS marine sniper (Unit 06017), twice says 'mortars were falling nearby' instead of 'mortar rounds', feigns amnesia over PSO-1 scope adjustments ('cold bore alignment with a screwdriver, hitting at 500 m by pure luck'), and invents a 'pipe-mud-clogged rifle barrel' alibi for VKR FSB to explain surrendering with full ammo and zero shots fired.
  • Engineering & Arithmetic Collapse of a '4-Year Computer Networks Specialist' ([14:02]–[16:51], [26:17]–[29:13]): After studying 'Computer Networks' for nearly 4 years at Sovetsk Technological College, defines elementary acronym VLAN as 'internal local network' ('vnutrennyaya'), cannot distinguish LAN from VLAN, and fails for 3 minutes to divide 1,000 minutes by 60 in his head.
  • Cognitive Bluff of an 'Anti-War Navalny/Katz Viewer' Claiming He Believed in 'Rear Airfield Security for RUB 2M' in Late 2025 ([39:55]–[59:11]): Boasts of daily opposition YouTube 'doomscrolling' (FBK, Navalny, Katz) and voting for Davankov in March 2024, yet under cross-examination admits he knew perfectly well why the RF MoD offered RUB 2M in year four of the war and traded his principles to escape microloan collectors.
Concealed Facts & Interviewer Blind Spots:
  • 'Zero-Ruble Contract' Bait-and-Switch & 96–98% Wipeout of the 60-Man Gas-Pipeline Assault Near Bohuslavka ([07:24]–[08:30], [40:26]–[41:35], [59:44]–[01:03:38]): Exposes how recruits lured as 'drivers, cooks, and bridge/airfield guards' received RUB 0, were dumped within 9 days into the 9th Assault Company of Unit 31132, and on 10.11.2025 had 60 men forced for 2–3 days through a trunk gas pipeline exiting 3.5 km from Bohuslavka (Borova community, Izium District) — out of all 60 men, he saw only one other survivor alive in captivity.
  • Concealed Younger Sister Masha Caught Live on Video Call & Mother's Secret Contact With an Exchanged Pipe Survivor ([09:41] vs [01:06:51]–[01:10:48]): Omits his younger sister during biographical intake, only for her to pop into frame on the video call ('Oh, Mashka! Mom, they said keep Masha off camera!'); his mother simultaneously reveals that although Unit 31132 listed him MIA for 11 months, an eyewitness comrade who saw Vladislav in captivity secretly contacted her.
  • Mother's Textbook On-Air Meltdown ('I'm a Peaceful Civilian, Ask Putin!') & Dread of 'Second-Wave' Disposal ([01:09:39], [01:14:14]–[01:24:20]): From Arkhangelsk Oblast, his mother unleashes classic Russian responsibility denial ('I'm a civilian, I know nothing! Ask Putin! My son is good, he went because he needed money!'), while Vladislav admits on camera that post-exchange returnees are sent straight back into assault to die.

POW INTERVIEW FORENSICS & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AUDIT (CASE #7: BALTIC FLEET MARINE SNIPER & EX-NAVAL CADET VLADISLAV SERGEYEVICH — 'AIRFIELD GUARD FOR 0 RUBLES' BAIT-AND-SWITCH, 60-MAN GAS-PIPELINE WIPEOUT NEAR BOHUSLAVKA, AND MATERNAL MELTDOWN LIVE ON AIR)

Primary Broadcast & Registry Verification:

Counterintelligence Audit of Case #7 — Vladislav Sergeyevich (Kaliningrad Naval Cadet & Baltic Fleet Marine Sniper Unit 06017 -> 9th Assault Company Unit 31132 Near Bohuslavka)

1. SUBJECT IDENTIFICATION & RUSSIAN FNS REGISTRY VERIFICATION

ParameterInterrogation Testimony (With Timecodes)Registry & Military Verification (FNS RF / MoD RF)
Name & BirthVladislav Sergeyevich ('Vlad'), b. 15.10.1999 (age 26 at recording, [02:55]–[03:29]), Bolshakovo settlement, Slavsky District, Kaliningrad Oblast, RF ([10:43]).Surname mumbled at intake; uniquely identified by combination Vladislav Sergeyevich + 15.10.1999 + Bolshakovo + 2016 Kaliningrad Naval Cadet Corps + 2019–2020 Sniper Coy Unit 06017.
Cadet, College & Marine Sniper Service1) 2013–2016 (grades 7–9): Andrew the First-Called Naval Cadet Boarding School (Kaliningrad, [11:15]–[13:28]).<br>2) 2016–2019: Sovetsk Technological College, Computer Networks ([13:28]–[16:51]).<br>3) 2019–2020: conscript designated sniper (SVD & SVDS rifles), Sniper Company, 336th Separate Guards Naval Infantry Brigade, Baltic Fleet (Military Unit 06017, Baltiysk) ([16:51]–[18:32]).Verified in FNS EGRUL: GBOU KO KSHI 'Andreya Pervozvannogo Kadetskiy Morskoy Korpus' (TIN 3904040429, OGRN 1023900599953, Kaliningrad). His high-demand marine sniper MOS explains why recruiters immediately routed him into frontline assault infantry despite promising airfield guard duty.
Civilian Debt Spiral (2020–2025)Bolshakovo postman (RUB 9,100/mo) -> Zelenograd Ozon warehouse -> St. Petersburg Perekrestok -> Tula OOO Farmservis -> contractor at Tula Unilever ice-cream plant, where shifts fell to 0 in Oct 2025 after Russian takeover while microloan debts topped RUB 300,000+ ([18:32]–[39:55]).Verified in FNS EGRUL: OOO 'FARMSERVIS' (TIN 5029248155 / 7743292677) and OOO 'ARNEST UNIRUS' (ex-Unilever Rus, TIN 7705183476, OGRN 1027739039240, Inshinsky Tula ice-cream plant, where 2024–2025 corporate takeover triggered contractor cuts).
Russian Assault Unit9th Assault Company, Military Unit 31132 (2nd Guards Tamanskaya MRD / 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow MD) ([41:00]).Signed 1-yr contract 22.10.2025 (RUB 0 paid of promised RUB 2M); entered gas pipe with ~60 men on 10.11.2025 toward Bohuslavka; captured 25.11.2025 and kept listed as MIA for 11 months ([01:06:18]).

2. KEY FORENSIC PROOFS & CROSS-LINK TO CASE #9

Profiled Targets
44
[RED: 32] · [BLUE: 12] · [NBU #65: 19]
Certified Bots (UID)
129
FB homoglyphs, 615-UIDs, YT ru-RU
RU Defense Plants (VPK)
150
9 weapon chains · 282 execs unsanctioned
Investigations
29
PsyOps & network forensics
Matrix Nodes / Edges
197 / 148
Botfarm amplification & RU state media
REGISTRY METHODOLOGY: TWO TECHNICAL CRITERIA OF HOSTILE INFORMATION OPERATIONS

[CRITERION 1 — Russian Botfarm Symbiosis & Selective Moderation]: systematic amplification by industrial Russian botfarms (ru-RU locale YouTube bots with Cyrillic hard-sign/yeru suffixes, Latin-Cyrillic homoglyph farms, .XXXXXX & id=615... batch autoregs, Russian regional profiles) combined with rapid deletion/blocking of factual comments while preserving Russian bots at the top of threads.
[CRITERION 2 — Synchronized Russian State Media Syndication]: rapid syndication (within 15–120 minutes) across Russian federal state outlets (TASS, RIA Novosti, Ukraina.ru / Rossiya Segodnya, Lenta.ru, Topwar.ru).

CERTIFIED REGISTRY OF IDENTIFIED GRU BOTS, BATCH AUTOREGS & NETWORK IDENTIFIERS

Every record is documented via archival profile/subscription extracts, numeric Facebook UID, or Russian ru-RU locale Cyrillic hard-sign/yeru handle suffixes

SPECIAL OSINT INVESTIGATIONS & NETWORK FORENSICS

INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY-CHAIN MATRIX: RUSSIAN WEAPON SYSTEM → 4 FACTORY TIERS (EXECUTIVES & CONTACTS)

Select a Russian weapon system to expand its 4-tier industrial supply chain (from prime design bureaus and propulsion to seekers, microelectronics, solid propellants, and explosives) with official registry executive contacts

RUSSIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY SANCTIONS COMPLIANCE RADAR ([UA-NSDC] · [US-OFAC] · [EU] · [UK]) & SANCTIONS GAPS

Despite entity-level designations, 77.3% of executive & engineering leadership (282 of 365 general directors, chief engineers, and technical directors) and 13 upstream & component defense plants remain OUTSIDE personal or direct US, EU, and UK sanctions lists

DEFENSE ENTERPRISE REGISTRY & EXECUTIVE CONTACTS: All 150 Russian VPK Defense Plants
Showing: 150 of 150 enterprises

OPEN RUSSIAN SBP PHONES (+7 9...) & TELEGRAM @HANDLES OF Z-CHANNELS AND UAV/EW PROCUREMENT FUNDS

Direct Russian SBP mobile numbers, bank recipient details, and contact Telegram @handles from public crowdfunding posts for UAVs, EW systems, optics, and tactical comms