EU Digital Services Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, Articles 34, 35 & 40) & DISARM Framework Technical FIMI / CIB Report: Forensic Evidence Matrix of 1,839 Russian Bot Accounts (Facebook 615... UIDs, .XXXXXX Batch Autoregs, Unicode Homoglyphs, YouTube ru-RU Pool, Selective Moderation Schedule & Synchronous TASS / RIA Novosti Relays)
Structured forensic audit of Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) and Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) as of November 2026: 1,839 verified Russian bot accounts (1,434 YouTube channels registered under Russian ru-RU OS locale suffixes -[U+044A]/-[U+044B]/-[U+044D], 189 six-digit .XXXXXX and .2025 batch autoregs, 78 Facebook numeric UIDs in series 615..., 63 Cyrillic-Latin Unicode homoglyph obfuscators and raw CSV templates, 117 cross-thread bridge bots across 24 dossiers), a 5-stage selective moderation pipeline, and 33 documented episodes of synchronous syndication by EU-sanctioned Russian state media (FSUE MIA Rossiya Segodnya / RIA Novosti / Ukraina.ru, TASS, Lenta.ru).
1. EU Regulatory Framework (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 — Digital Services Act, Articles 34, 35 & 40) & EEAS FIMI / DISARM Taxonomy
Under Articles 34 and 35 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (Digital Services Act — DSA), providers of designated Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs — specifically Meta Platforms Ireland Limited for Facebook/Instagram and Google Ireland Limited for YouTube) are legally required to assess and mitigate systemic risks arising from the intentional and coordinated manipulation of their service (Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior — CIB), the deployment of automated or inauthentic accounts, and the exploitation of algorithmic recommender and comment-ranking systems by Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) networks. Furthermore, Article 2f of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 prohibits broadcasting, enabling, or otherwise facilitating the distribution of content produced by designated Russian state media holdings (FSUE MIA Rossiya Segodnya / RIA Novosti / Ukraina.ru, TASS).
The machine-readable and visual forensic evidence matrix compiled by OPERBAZA.ORG (/en/bots#dsa-fimi-cib-matrix, /feeds/fimi-cib-dsa-matrix.json, /exports/en_bots.csv) consolidates 1,839 verified Russian botfarm accounts, 117 cross-thread bridge bots (operating simultaneously across 75 overlap pairs linking 24 political and media dossiers), 15 active non-geoblocked YouTube mirror channels of NSDC-sanctioned individuals (availableCountryCodes: "UA"), and 33 documented episodes of synchronous headline syndication by Russian federal state media outlets.
FIMI / CIB Forensic Dataset Metric (OPERBAZA.ORG) | Verified Count | Technical Forensic Signature & Primary Identifier Class | EU Regulatory Standard / DISARM Red Framework v1.5 |
|---|---|---|---|
Total Verified Bot & Autoreg Accounts in Registry (/en/bots) | 1,839 | Immutable numeric UIDs, 24-character YouTube Channel IDs (UC...), archived profile/subscription/thread evidence | DSA Art. 34(1)(c), Art. 35(1)(c)-(d), Art. 40 |
Pillar 1A: Facebook Numeric 615... Series UIDs (profile.php?id=615...) | 78 *(72 in numeric_615_autoreg + 6 cross-tagged)* | Series 6155...–6159... without vanity slugs, Digital Creator shell mode, 0 city / 0 education / 0 bio, or inverted follower ratios (82 followers / 433 following) | DISARM TA05 / T0007 (Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages / Accounts) |
Pillar 1B: 6-Digit Batch Autoregs (.XXXXXX) & .2025 Series | 189 *(139 .XXXXXX + 42 .2025 + 8 cross-tagged)* | Serial URL suffixes (.341541, .502469, .789992, .754565, .2025), African/South Asian Reels warm-up graphs, locked UID 1000... shells | DISARM TA05 / T0049 (Flood Information Space / Synthetic Swarm) |
| Pillar 1C: Unicode Cyrillic-Latin Homoglyphs & Raw CSV Templates | 63 | Substitution of Cyrillic i (U+0456), s (U+0441), a (U+0430), o (U+043E), e (U+0435) with Latin ASCII i (U+0069), c (U+0063), a (U+0061), o (U+006F), e (U+0065); raw CSV column header Higher Education Kyiv retained in profile education field | DISARM TA06 / T0056 (Bypass Content Filters via Character Obfuscation) |
Pillar 1D: YouTube ru-RU System Locale Botfarm (-[U+044A] / -[U+044B] / -[U+044D]) | 1,434 *(+ 117 cross-thread bridge bots)* | 24-character UC... Channel IDs with auto-generated Russian OS locale suffixes (U+044A hard sign, U+044B yery, U+044D reverse-e) absent from the Ukrainian alphabet | DSA Art. 34 & 35 / EU Code of Practice Commitment 18 |
Active Unblocked YouTube Mirrors of NSDC-Sanctioned Subjects (UA_OPEN: True) | 15 *(+ 24 nodes in sanctioned_ru_project)* | Open country code "UA" in availableCountryCodes (249 countries), PlayabilityStatus: OK without VPN in Ukraine, amplified by ru-RU bot accounts | DSA Art. 34(1)(a)-(c) / EU Accession Chapter 31 CFSP |
| Pillar 1E: Selective Moderation Schedule & Synchronous Russian State Media Relays | 76 dossiers / 33 state media relays | Deletion of verified citizen comments citing state registries (EDR, EDRSR, Prozorro) while preserving Russian bots in top-1..top-5 (Most Relevant) + pickup by TASS / RIA Novosti / Ukraina.ru within 15–120 min | DISARM TA08 / T0046 & TA09 / T0116 / Council Reg. (EU) 833/2014 Art. 2f |
2. Pillars 1A & 1B: Forensic Anatomy of Facebook Numeric 615... UID Pools & 6-Digit Batch Autoregs (.XXXXXX / .2025)
Across Meta Platforms (Facebook), initial comment-thread saturation within the first 5–25 minutes of a target post relies on two standardized account-generation architectures:
- Numeric
615...Series Pool (78verified UIDs spanning61551048542691–61595115906538): accounts are batch-registered without vanity usernames (https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=615...), switched intoDigital Creatorprofessional dashboard mode to mask empty friend lists behind follower/following counters, and exhibit zero biographical metadata (0city,0education,0workplace). - 6-Digit Batch Suffixes (
.XXXXXX) &.2025Wave (189verified accounts): accounts bearing automated 6-digit numeric URL suffixes and Russian-to-ASCII transliteration script defects (ura.savickij.341541UID 100058459429900,denis.borisov.502469,roman.novikov.789992UID 100027614651933,larisa.kovaleva.754565UID 100006721178005,ludmila.vasenko.679280UID 100059986742650,aleksandr.mihajlovskij.343301UID 100029970560548, simultaneous doubled-name factory clonesgalina.galina.772599UID 100027749074181andgalina.galina.270337UID 100039224829973, and.2025batch shellsjura.andrushko.2025UID 100053283187923,fedor.fedir.2025UID 100026693023411,mihail.gubanov.2025UID 100078263889441,aleksei.sokolenko.2025UID 100040230424870).
| Verified Facebook UID | Profile Handle / Display Name | CIB Category | Technical Forensic Signature & Observed Thread Deployment |
|---|---|---|---|
61564945321609 | Vitaliy Melnychenko (id=61564945321609) | numeric_615_autoreg | Digital Creator shell (67 followers / 78 following, 0 city, 0 education, 0 bio) posting Russian-calque invective in B. Bereza's thread (30–31.10.2026, Supreme Court lawsuit against NSDC sanctions) |
61594656912880 | Andrey Olshansky (id=61594656912880) | homoglyph_farm / 615... | Locked autoreg pinned at Rank #1 (Most Relevant) on O. Goncharenko's wall under the US State Dept $2.1B FMS sale of 500 Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors: evades Meta filters via 3 Latin ASCII homoglyphs i (U+0069) embedded inside Cyrillic words |
61582015375009 | Nataliya Kachan (id=61582015375009) | numeric_615_autoreg | 6158... numeric autoreg deploying Russian-surzhyk lexical calques on O. Stadnik's default wall under his wartime elections post (pfbid0dTQUTV...) |
61582753621994 | Lyubava Prekrasna (id=61582753621994) | numeric_615_autoreg | Inverted follower ratio (82 followers / 433 following), posting two consecutive social-collapse comments on O. Popenko's default wall (29.10.2026, pfbid02UxkuA3...) |
61571748419988 | Ulyana Mykolaychuk (id=61571748419988) | numeric_615_autoreg | Paired 6157... numeric autoreg deployed in the same O. Popenko thread (29.10.2026) |
61592089256402 | Andriy Andriyiv (id=61592089256402) | numeric_615_autoreg | 6159... numeric autoreg admitted into the restricted comment whitelist on M. Bezuhla's page (28–29.10.2026) |
61585982231409 | Druzenko. Krayina. (id=61585982231409) | pseudo_page / 615... | Brand-hijack pseudo-page on the 6158... numeric range (36k followers, Reels with 236k views), cross-seeding threads on D. Chekalkin and O. Drozdov |
100058459429900 | Yura Savitskyi (ura.savickij.341541) | batch_autoreg_6digit | 65k-follower aggregator node with .341541 6-digit suffix and Russian surname spelling calque, amplifying night anti-mobilization Reels (02–03.11.2026) |
100027614651933 | Roman Novikov (roman.novikov.789992) | batch_autoreg_6digit | Locked Russian-language 6-digit batch autoreg (.789992, 0 city, 0 education, 0 bio) in top anti-mobilization comment slots |
100006721178005 | Larisa Kovaleva (larisa.kovaleva.754565) | batch_autoreg_6digit | 6-digit batch profile in Digital Creator mode (99 followers / 149 following, 0 bio) deployed in the same thread |
100027749074181 & 100039224829973 | Galina Galina (galina.galina.772599 & galina.galina.270337) | batch_autoreg_6digit | Two simultaneous doubled-name Galina Galina factory clones with 6-digit suffixes .772599 and .270337 deployed in the exact same thread |
100053283187923 | Jura Andrushko (jura.andrushko.2025) | autoreg_2025 | Serial .2025 wave autoreg pinned at Rank #1 on the default comment wall |
3. Pillar 1C: Mixed-Script Unicode Homoglyph Obfuscation & Raw CSV Import Artifacts (63 Accounts)
To bypass automated toxicity classifiers and keyword spam filters on Meta and YouTube, Russian botfarm operators systematically employ mixed-script Unicode homoglyph substitution: within Cyrillic words targeting air defense, mobilization, or state institutions, individual Cyrillic code points are replaced with visually identical Latin ASCII characters:
- Cyrillic
i(U+0456) $ ightarrow$ Latin ASCIIi(U+0069) (documented inUID 61594656912880Andrey Olshansky,UID 100033677342526Eva Henova,UID 61571489427922Andrey Semenov); - Cyrillic
s(U+0441) $ ightarrow$ Latin ASCIIc(U+0063) and Cyrillico(U+043E) $ ightarrow$ Latin ASCIIo(U+006F) (ludmila.bondarenko.45557,UID 61555369634837tamara.cimona, and theHeorhiy Mazuraccount containing 4 homoglyphs in a single sentence); - Unedited CSV Column Header Artifact (
UID 100011388163548—kamila.zalevska): during automated bulk account creation from a spreadsheet, the profile'sEducationfield literally retained the raw CSV column headerHigher Education Kyiv, while itsInstagramfield retained an unparsed session hash string.
4. Pillar 1D: YouTube ru-RU System Locale Botfarm (-[U+044A] / -[U+044B] / -[U+044D], 1,434 UC... Channels), 117 Cross-Thread Bridge Bots & 15 Active NSDC Mirrors
On YouTube (Google Ireland Limited), our audit documented 1,434 automated channels (UC...) masquerading as Ukrainian citizens while carrying an immutable forensic indicator of their creation environment. When bulk registration scripts create YouTube accounts with Cyrillic display names inside a browser or anti-detect environment configured with a Russian system locale (ru-RU), YouTube's automated @handle generator appends a 3-to-4 character disambiguation suffix drawn from the Russian phonetic table, injecting the strictly Russian letters hard sign (U+044A), yery (U+044B), and reverse-e (U+044D) — characters that do not exist in the Ukrainian alphabet or Ukrainian keyboard layout.
Cross-thread graph analysis across 40,224 parsed comments (39,311 on YouTube and 913 on Facebook) identified 117 cross-thread bridge bots (cross_lom_bridge_bots) operating synchronously across multiple independent political comment threads and NSDC-sanctioned mirror channels:
Technical YouTube Channel ID (UC...) | Auto-Generated Handle (Transliterated / Unicode) | Russian OS Locale Forensic Marker | Simultaneous Dossiers Amplified (/en/dossiers) |
|---|---|---|---|
UCYRzMzblP2LFgVfwBYD3k-A | @Bohdan-[U+044A]6yu6k | Suffix -[U+044A]6yu6k: Russian hard sign U+044A | 4 dossiers: bereza, chekalkin, poroshenko, zheleznyak |
UCEjQMF0wEKSm2pGj6yfXulg | @VolodymyrPasichnyk-v2[U+044D] | Suffix -v2[U+044D]: Russian letter U+044D | 4 dossiers: bereza, chekalkin, drozdov, nudniy-pens |
UCAH_yVgWKhk_cVMg5WXTwkQ | @MykolaFomenko-n1[U+044A] | Suffix -n1[U+044A]: Russian hard sign U+044A | 4 dossiers: ariev, chekalkin, nudniy-pens, poroshenko |
UCbnz80Gw4QJFWxC23eXXlkA | @Lyza-s4s9[U+044A] | Suffix -s4s9[U+044A]: Russian hard sign U+044A | 3 dossiers: bereza, chekalkin, poroshenko (+ NSDC mirror UC7cv4INhQQwfJqiU-mel0QQ) |
UCAGV2szZbDkLVjxw1hFxyHQ | @VolodymyrTarasyuk-[U+044A]7sh | Suffix -[U+044A]7sh: Russian hard sign U+044A | 3 dossiers: bereza, shabunin-nikolov, zheleznyak |
UCp7KKsDkuV5sGm-R2wI3JoQ | @OlehPavlyk-[U+044B]4e | Suffix -[U+044B]4e: Russian letter U+044B | 3 dossiers: mosiychuk, sanctions-mirrors, soskin |
UCG5fDE3L8jh2cILCvkGk40w | @Stepan-zh4[U+044A]2y | Suffix -zh4[U+044A]2y: Russian hard sign U+044A | 3 dossiers: bereza, chekalkin, drozdov |
UCCEH0ScioEYKy2Q0AYJD2rg | @LarysaKravchenko-p7[U+044A] | Suffix -p7[U+044A]: Russian hard sign U+044A | 3 dossiers: bereza, chekalkin, shabunin-nikolov |
UCWor0UszzYY3UF2oWYjfGxA | @EvhenyyaSavchenko-v3[U+044A] | Suffix -v3[U+044A]: Russian hard sign U+044A | 3 dossiers: bereza, goncharenko, sanctions-mirrors |
UCx2BMxA-1IIAYsuA5n_mYKg | @Lena-[U+044B]8h9sh | Suffix -[U+044B]8h9sh: Russian letter U+044B | 3 dossiers: bereza, goncharenko, simutin-korupciya-info |
UCEgaMRr4nEKESiPRNNzj1sw | @Kamy-[U+044D]4s | Suffix -[U+044D]4s: Russian letter U+044D | 3 dossiers: ariev, kushch, shariy |
UCFpYTgpENsX2ao42oGl-MZg | @viktorserdyuk-[U+044B]5o | Suffix -[U+044B]5o: Russian letter U+044B | 3 dossiers: bereza, chekalkin, poroshenko |
This same ru-RU bot pool actively amplifies 15 unblocked YouTube mirror and relay channels of NSDC-sanctioned subjects (UCyDRD4u-G9rUTlUGRein_hw, UC-uCKJq_bRs5pFE8bMNy6kQ, UCyeoETklSyLA-jQe565U03g, UC24jZmCZLi3w4j4H8MjJGEg, UCTvUuw11b844xI-JFT7tQew, UC7cv4INhQQwfJqiU-mel0QQ, UCYS8kqVQzP4pfpmw5XIagMA, UCvckh1Db64fbmfiddPoZ6LA, UC_iPAFzu0nkZkn9vaeWdPrA, UCS4aVDaOvIK0-3voQv49pKQ, UCUEiXr94u-obIqTkMAODg2w, UCurgcc4qcz3-_ibm3XxKUjQ, UCBSYa5zQvjL-Y2D89L_OyEw, UCiV8lEPfB0NVwfgWuSXSaiQ, UCgtxz5_xa6xkDTghNPkuRYw) streaming into Ukraine with open country code availableCountryCodes: "UA".
5. Pillar 1E: 5-Stage Selective Moderation Schedule & Binary Relay to TASS / RIA Novosti / Ukraina.ru (33 Documented Relays)
A core forensic finding for EU regulators (DG CONNECT and EEAS StratCom) is that Russian synthetic botfarms on Facebook and YouTube operate as Stages 2 and 3 of an integrated 5-stage cross-platform FIMI relay pipeline:
T+00..05 min(Narrative Seeding / DISARMTA01): Publication of the primary narrative on a target page (e.g., attacking US FMS deliveries of 500 Patriot PAC-3 MSE missiles or domestic cruise/ballistic missile programs).T+05..25 min(Coordinated Synthetic Swarm Injection / DISARMTA05): Synchronous entry of615...numeric UIDs,.XXXXXXbatch autoregs, homoglyph accounts, andru-RUYouTube bots (-[U+044A]/-[U+044B]/-[U+044D]) cross-liking each other to capture the top slots of the defaultMost Relevantcomment view.T+15..45 min(Selective Moderation Schedule — Criterion #1 / DISARMTA06): Page moderators systematically delete comments from verified Ukrainian citizens citing official state registries (EDR,EDRSR,Prozorro) and block their authors, while leaving Russian synthetic bot accounts (615...,.XXXXXX, homoglyphs,ru-RU) untouched at Rank #1..#5 of the default thread view.T+30..90 min(VLOP/VLOSE Algorithmic Recommender Exploitation / DSA Art. 34 & 35): Skewed comment sentiment and synthetic engagement velocity trigger Meta and YouTube recommender promotion.T+15..120 min(Synchronous Binary Relay to Russian State Media — Criterion #2 / Council Reg. 833/2014 Art. 2f): EU-sanctioned Russian federal state media (FSUE MIA Rossiya Segodnya / RIA Novosti / Ukraina.ru, TASS, Lenta.ru) syndicate the post and cite the curated bot comments as "Ukrainian public outrage" (including *Ukraina.ru* composite article1084102674of27.10.2026, 16:31simultaneously citing V. Barvinenko, O. Goncharenko, and Y. Kasyanov against the FP-5 'Flamingo' missile program; *RIA Novosti* articles2127422181and21277...of28–29.10.2026; *Ukraina.ru* dispatches1084063586,1084040964,1084064177,1084033099and *Lenta.ru* reports of24–29.10.2026).
6. Technical Recommendations for Meta CIB Team, Google TAG / YouTube & European Commission DG CONNECT (DSA Enforcement)
- For Meta Platforms Ireland Limited (CIB Threat Intelligence & DSA Art. 34/35 Compliance):
- deploy automated cluster detection and batch remediation targeting
profile.php?id=615...accounts inDigital Creatormode with zero biographical graph and 6-digit.XXXXXX/.2025batch autoregs (78+189verified profiles in/feeds/fimi-cib-dsa-matrix.json); - implement mixed-script Cyrillic-Latin homoglyph normalization (
U+0069$ ightarrow$U+0456,U+0063$ ightarrow$U+0441,U+0061$ ightarrow$U+0430,U+0065$ ightarrow$U+0435,U+006F$ ightarrow$U+043E) in theMost Relevantcomment-ranking pre-processor and flag unedited CSV profile fields (Higher Education KyivinUID 100011388163548). - For Google Threat Analysis Group (TAG) & YouTube Trust & Safety (DSA Art. 34/35 Compliance):
- execute batch forensic verification and takedown of the
1,434YouTube channels (UC...) combining Ukrainian-persona display names with auto-generated Russianru-RUOS locale suffixes (U+044A,U+044B,U+044D), prioritizing the117cross-thread bridge bots (UCYRzMzblP2LFgVfwBYD3k-A,UCEjQMF0wEKSm2pGj6yfXulg,UCAH_yVgWKhk_cVMg5WXTwkQ, etc.); - extend beneficial-owner geoblocking in Ukraine (
availableCountryCodes) across all15active mirror channels (UC...) operating on behalf of NSDC-sanctioned individuals. - For the European Commission — DG CONNECT (Directorate F, DSA Systemic Risk & FIMI Enforcement) & EEAS StratCom:
- incorporate selective comment moderation preserving synthetic bot swarms (Criterion #1) and synchronous relay to Russian state media designated under Article 2f of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (Criterion #2) into systemic risk audits of VLOPs/VLOSEs under Articles 34, 35, and 40 of the Digital Services Act.
All machine-readable datasets are available at:
- Interactive FIMI / CIB Matrix:
/en/bots#dsa-fimi-cib-matrix(UA:/bots#dsa-fimi-cib-matrix) - EU DSA / DISARM JSON Feed:
/feeds/fimi-cib-dsa-matrix.json - Full Bot Registry CSV Export:
/exports/en_bots.csv(UA:/exports/bots.csv)