OSINT BLIND SPOTS 9 MIN READ 2026-11-05 · M-13

Amsterdam's BGP Router for Iskanders and Rostec: How RIPE NCC (KvK 40539632) Dismisses 90.12% of Sanctions Alerts and Signs RPKI ROAs for Russian VPK and Occupied Melitopol Telecom

On 22 October 2026, the Amsterdam-based Regional Internet Registry RIPE NCC (Stationsplein 11, KvK 40539632) published its Q4 2026 Quarterly Sanctions Transparency Report (RIPE-868): out of 2,339 EU/OFAC sanctions alerts since April 2022, 2,108 (90.12%) were dismissed, and the Russian Federation accounts for a microscopic 0.32% (15,616 out of 4,850,688) of frozen IPv4 addresses. Using primary records from rest.db.ripe.net and live BGP/RPKI telemetry, we demonstrate how IT and telecom subsidiaries of EU-sanctioned Russian defense holdings (Rostec, Rosatom, Almaz-Antey, KTRV, UAC, USC, VGTRK, ANO Dialog, Zvezda, TsNIIMash) and occupied Melitopol telecom hold 35 ASNs and 117,024 unfrozen IPv4 addresses in Amsterdam valued at $2.22 million.

1. The Myth of the 'Sovereign Runet' and the Building at Stationsplein 11 in Amsterdam

Whenever Russian generals and Ministry of Digital Development officials boast on television about a 'sovereign, import-independent Runet', observers outside network engineering often imagine a master switch in Moscow. In reality, global packet routing between Russian defense conglomerates, missile design bureaus, state corporation data centers, and the outside world rests on the legal foundation of a single association incorporated under Dutch law (*Vereniging*) across from Amsterdam Central Station: Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC), Stationsplein 11, 1012 AB Amsterdam, Netherlands, Dutch Chamber of Commerce registration KvK 40539632 (RSIN 801699036; Managing Director: Hans Petter Holen; Chief Legal Officer: Athina Fragkouli).

Operating under the jurisdiction of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, RIPE NCC exercises a regional monopoly over:

allocating, registering, and maintaining public IPv4 (inetnum), IPv6 (inet6num), and Autonomous System Number (aut-num / ASN) blocks across Europe, the Russian Federation, and Central Asia;
maintaining the registry of Local Internet Registries (LIRs) and organisation objects (**ORG-***);
signing cryptographic Route Origin Authorizations (RPKI ROAs) under its root certificate authority (TA: RIPE NCC RPKI Root), without which European and North American Tier-1 transit providers drop BGP announcements as invalid;
approving or freezing transfers of scarce IPv4 blocks on the European secondary market, where public IPv4 blocks constitute liquid intangible assets (as formally confirmed to RIPE NCC by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the definition of "economic resources" in Article 1(d) and Article 2 of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014).

As a Dutch legal entity, RIPE NCC is strictly bound by the Dutch Sanctions Act (Sanctiewet 1977), Article 2 of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (freezing all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held, or controlled by designated entities and their 50%+ subsidiaries), and Article 5n of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (prohibiting IT consultancy, cloud, and technical services to legal persons established in Russia).

2. Mathematical Verdict from RIPE NCC's Own Disclosure: Inside Document RIPE-868 (Q4 2026)

On 22 October 2026, RIPE NCC published its latest quarterly disclosure — RIPE-868: Quarterly Sanctions Transparency Report (Q4 2026) (URL: https://www.ripe.net/documents/4651/ripe-868.pdf, SHA-256: 0878f45e835fcc5d0a83be7fc503c6bbebbb60fd24ae5882e18738b35c84135e; preceding Q3 2026 edition published 23 July 2026: RIPE-864, SHA-256: 6ad502852539e7939abd27387365842262851a66690eec5c0e0fd2f0246b08b8).

The official figures in Table 1 and Table 2 of RIPE-868 (status as of 1 October 2026) expose a systemic compliance failure:

A 90.12% Dismissal Rate: Out of 2,339 sanctions alerts generated since April 2022, RIPE NCC froze only 53 cases (2.27%), placed 20 cases (0.85%) On hold, and dismissed 2,108 cases (90.12%) under the label *"Confirmed false positive, EU sanctioned not applicable, exempted, or OFAC"*.
Russia Accounts for 0.32% of Frozen IPv4 Space: Across all countries in Table 2 of RIPE-868, RIPE NCC has frozen or placed on hold 4,850,688 IPv4 addresses. However, 4,631,552 addresses (95.48%) belong to Iran (IR) and 216,064 addresses (4.45%) belong to Syria (SY), whereas the entire Russian Federation (RU) in the fifth year of full-scale war accounts for just 15,616 IPv4 addresses (0.32%) and 34 ASNs (5 Frozen LIR Members holding 9,472 IPs, 24 Frozen End Users holding 5,376 IPs, and 3 On-Hold End Users holding 768 IPs).

Why does Amsterdam's screening pipeline dismiss 90.12% of alerts? Because RIPE NCC screens Latin-transliterated organisation names largely for literal string matches against Annex I of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, systematically failing to trace 50%+ ownership and control (EU Best Practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures, paras. 62–68) across wholly-owned IT integrators, telecom subsidiaries, and dedicated LIR shields of sanctioned Russian defense holdings.

3. How Table 2 of RIPE-868 Mathematically Proves that Rostec, Rosatom, UAC, and VGTRK Pools Remain Unfrozen

Because Table 2 of RIPE-868 itemizes every single one of the 32 frozen or on-hold Russian entries by exact type (Member vs. End User), IPv4 count, IPv6 count, and ASN count, cross-referencing RIPE-868 against live queries to rest.db.ripe.net and stat.ripe.net as of 5 November 2026 yields mathematical proof of non-freezing:

Zero Russian LIR Members (Member | RU) holding more than 3,072 IPv4 addresses are frozen. Table 2 of RIPE-868 lists only five frozen Russian LIR Members: three with 1,024 IPs, one with 2,048 IPs (and 0 IPv6), and one with 3,072 IPs. This proves with 100% mathematical certainty that:
ORG-ASTa1-RIPE (FGUP VGTRK / All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, INN 7714072839, OGRN 1027700310076) — an active LIR holding AS25292, 4,096 IPv4 addresses (80.247.32.0/20), and 2a05:f0c0::/29 IPv6 — is 100% UNFROZEN, despite FGUP VGTRK being directly designated under EU Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 since December 2022;
ORG-AJ134-RIPE (JSC Atomdata, INN 9725031147, OGRN 1207700111277) — the data-center and cloud LIR subsidiary of JSC Concern Rosenergoatom (INN 7721632827, OGRN 5087746119951) and State Corporation Rosatom (INN 7706413348, OGRN 1077799032926), holding AS199860 / AS214817, 2a01:6520::/32 IPv6, and 7,424 IPv4 addresses (with 193.43.41.0/24 modified in RIPE DB on 2026-10-09) — is 100% UNFROZEN;
ORG-DL236-RIPE (LLC DDoS-Guard, INN 9204005780, OGRN 1149204010988) — an active LIR holding 8,192 IPv4 addresses (45.10.240.0/22, 91.215.40.0/22, 95.129.232.0/21, 185.178.208.0/22 et al., with AS57724 modified 2026-10-20), routing EU-sanctioned rt.com (ANO TV-Novosti, INN 7704552473, OGRN 1057746595367) and tvzvezda.ru — is 100% UNFROZEN;
ORG-IZL1-RIPE (LLC BI.ZONE, INN 9701036178, OGRN 1167746317210) — the 100% cybersecurity subsidiary of EU-sanctioned PJSC Sberbank (INN 7707083893, OGRN 1027700132195), holding 2,048 IPv4 addresses (185.163.156.0/22, 185.191.32.0/22) plus 2a0a:400::/32 IPv6 (the sole frozen 2,048-IP Russian LIR in Table 2 has 0 IPv6) and routing the official web portal of State Corporation Rostec (rostec.ru -> 185.163.159.23, INN 7704274402, OGRN 1077799030847) via AS207104 — is 100% UNFROZEN.
All 27 frozen or on-hold Russian End User entries in Table 2 of RIPE-868 have 0 IPv6 blocks, at most 1,024 IPv4 addresses, and at most 2 ASNs. This proves that RIPE NCC has left completely unfrozen:
ORG-LR156-RIPE (LLC RT-Inform, INN 7704810710, OGRN 1127746501190) — the 100% central IT and cybersecurity integrator of State Corporation Rostec (INN 7704274402), holding AS48723 (modified 2026-07-17), 512 IPv4 (194.190.191.0/24, 195.208.193.0/24), and 2001:67c:1c0::/48 IPv6;
ORG-KI11-RIPE (PJSC KAMAZ, INN 1650032058, OGRN 1021602013971, directly sanctioned by EU, US, and UK) — holding AS50342 and 2,048 IPv4 addresses (109.95.104.0/21), double the maximum of any frozen Russian End User in RIPE-868;
ORG-SPC9-RIPE (PJSC Yakovlev, formerly PJSC Irkut Corporation, INN 3807002509, OGRN 1023801428111, Su-30SM2 fighter manufacturer under PJSC UAC INN 7708619320, OGRN 1067759884598) — holding 3 ASNs (AS39252, AS48035, AS62389), with AS48035 modified on 2026-01-14;
ORG-TFSU1-RIPE (FGUP MIA Rossiya Segodnya, INN 7704853840, OGRN 5137746242937, AS44479, AS57352), ORG-ISE2-RIPE (FGUP ITAR-TASS, INN 7703082786, OGRN 1037700049606, AS51186, AS62344, 1,536 IPv4 + 2001:678:124::/48 IPv6), and ORG-JG70-RIPE (JSC Goznak, INN 7813252159, OGRN 1167847225281, EU-sanctioned since October 2022, with AS209520 modified in RIPE DB on 2026-04-18).

4. Cryptographic RPKI ROAs Signed by RIPE NCC Root: TsNIIMash Missile Institute, Russian MoD Broadcaster Zvezda, and Occupied Melitopol Telecom

Querying stat.ripe.net/data/rpki-validation reveals that RIPE NCC's own cryptographic root authority (TA: RIPE NCC RPKI Root) actively signs valid RPKI ROA certificates for sanctioned Russian military and occupation infrastructure:

JSC TsNIIMash (INN 5018200994, OGRN 1195081054310) — Roscosmos head rocket and spacecraft research institute (ORG-JA462-RIPE): holds AS212732 and 46.61.181.0/24, backed by 3 active RPKI ROA VALID (TA: RIPE NCC RPKI Root) certificates (46.61.181.0/24 -> AS212732).
JSC Russian Armed Forces Broadcasting Company ZVEZDA (INN 7717653542, OGRN 1097746338403) — official broadcaster of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (ORG-FA303-RIPE): directly designated under EU Regulations (EU) No 269/2014 and 833/2014, yet holds active AS48552 and 89.208.99.0/24 with a live RPKI ROA VALID (TA: RIPE NCC RPKI Root) for 89.208.99.0/24 -> AS48552.
MUE "Sea Telecom" / GUP ZO "More Telecom" (Russian occupation INN 9001000730, OGRN 1229000000910) — Russian military-civilian administration telecom operator in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Region, Ukraine (ORG-MA2129-RIPE): RIPE NCC in Amsterdam maintains record MUE "SEA TELECOM" VGA MELITOPOL ZAPORIZHIE REGION at *Zaporozhye region, Melitopol, Bogdan Khmelnitsky Ave. 28*, explicitly tagged with country: RU, assigned AS215503 (modified 2026-02-03) and 185.178.244.0/24, and signed with a live RPKI ROA VALID (TA: RIPE NCC RPKI Root) — in direct breach of Ukraine's territorial integrity and Council Regulations (EU) No 269/2014 and (EU) 2022/1903.

The complete bilingual compliance matrix of all 18 Russian VPK and Z-infrastructure clusters (32 RIPE org-ids, 35 ASNs, 117,024 IPv4 addresses valued at $2,219,956) and competent Dutch/EU enforcement channels (FIOD fiod.infodesk@belastingdienst.nl, Dutch Ministry of Finance sancties@minfin.nl, Ministry of Economic Affairs meldpuntsancties@minezk.nl, RDI info@rdi.nl, and European Commission DG FISMA) is published in /en/sanctions-gap#ripe-ipv4-matrix.

[APPLY THIS METHODOLOGY IN PRACTICE: /en/sanctions-gap#ripe-ipv4-matrix →]

Profiled Targets

[RED: 54] · [BLUE: 22] · [NBU #65: 47]

ROC / FSB Network (EDR + FNS)

74 / 26

74 active UA EDRPOU · Rosatom · SBU

Certified Bots (UID)

1839

FB homoglyphs, 615-UIDs, YT ru-RU

RU Defense Plants (VPK)

202

9 weapon chains · 369 execs unsanctioned

Investigations

PsyOps & network forensics

Matrix Nodes / Edges

201 / 151

Botfarm amplification & RU state media

DATA SOURCES — OFFICIAL OPEN RUSSIAN STATE REGISTRIES & OPENSANCTIONS (OSINT / COMPLIANCE): Corporate identifiers (TIN/INN, PSRN/OGRN), industrial facility coordinates, transliterated directors and chief engineers, official switchboard phones, and corporate e-mails derive from official open Russian state registries (FNS EGRUL, Rostekhnadzor, EIS Goszakupki, e-disclosure.ru) cross-referenced against international sanctions lists ([UA-NSDC], [US-OFAC] SDN/CSL, [EU] Council, [UK] FCDO as of 2026-10-30).

[ZAKhIDNIY KONTUR VPK · 6 MATRITs] [SANCTIONS GAP: 305 EXECS / 14 PLANTS] EXPORT FtM .JSONL EXPORT /vpk.json [879] EXPORT /vpk.csv (879 Excel)

INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY-CHAIN MATRIX: RUSSIAN WEAPON SYSTEM → 4 FACTORY TIERS (EXECUTIVES & CONTACTS)

Select a Russian weapon system to expand its 4-tier industrial supply chain (from prime design bureaus and propulsion to seekers, microelectronics, solid propellants, and explosives) with official registry executive contacts

RUSSIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY SANCTIONS COMPLIANCE RADAR ([UA-NSDC] · [US-OFAC] · [EU] · [UK]) & SANCTIONS GAPS

Despite entity-level designations, 78.7% of executive & engineering leadership (369 of 469 general directors, chief engineers, and technical directors) and 22 upstream & component defense plants remain OUTSIDE personal or direct US, EU, and UK sanctions lists

SANCTIONS GAP WATCHLIST (305 / 14) → FtM .JSONL .JSON .CSV

DEFENSE ENTERPRISE REGISTRY & EXECUTIVE CONTACTS: All 202 Russian VPK Defense Plants

Showing: 202 of 202 enterprises

OPEN-SOURCE TRANSCRIPT CROSS-AUDIT (PUBLIC YOUTUBE INTERVIEWS): Forensic analysis based exclusively on officially published interviews with captured Russian soldiers on the channels of Dmytro Karpenko (“Apostol” / @DmytroKarpenko) and Volodymyr Zolkin (@VolodymyrZolkin). Every timestamped claim is cross-checked against engineering physics, military topography, clinical medicine, and open Russian state/court registries.

VERIFICATION METHODOLOGY: RUSSIAN POW DECEPTION PATTERNS & TECHNICAL INCONSISTENCIES

Systematization of cover stories ("water carriers / cooks / locksmiths") and engineering, medical, and tactical inconsistencies in open interviews

1. Tailored for Post-Exchange FSB Counterintelligence Filtration

Experienced contract personnel tailor their answers not for Ukrainian viewers, but for post-exchange FSB Military Counterintelligence interrogation at Mosrentgen: attributing technical/defense details to "engineers", avoiding war-crime admissions, and recording on camera that they ran out of ammunition and were captured by surprise.

2. Blind Spot #1: Engineering Physics ("9th-Grade Locksmith Commissioning 50m Lines")

Non-engineering interviewers miss technical contradictions in civilian cover stories: when a subject claims 9th-grade manual labor yet travels on industrial commissioning deployments for 50-meter production lines while reciting physical impossibilities about metallurgical or defense machinery.

3. Blind Spot #2: Clinical Impossibility of the "Water Carrier" Cover Story

The POW claims 30-km foot marches hauling heavy water and ration packs, yet admits in the same interview to a severed arm artery with post-surgical contracture, a punctured lung, and spinal disc herniation—conditions clinically incompatible with heavy porter duty.

4. Blind Spot #3: Masking Academy/University Years (Ages 17–21) with "Juvenile Prison"

To conceal military academy or technical university enrollment between ages 17 and 21, the operative fabricates a 3.5-year juvenile prison sentence—yet fails to recall the basic reason for his alleged first arrest.

5. Blind Spot #4: Unscripted Slips by Relatives During Live Phone Calls

Relatives on live phone calls do not know the cover story just told in the studio and expose reality within seconds: dug-in forward observation/hideout duty ("sitting buried on drops of water"), missing bank payouts, or sensitive contact names whom the POW abruptly silences.

6. Blind Spot #5: Instant Specialist Reflexes (Optics, Weapons & GRU Tactics)

An alleged untrained "water carrier" who claims to have fired a rifle twice on a range accurately identifies Ukrainian SOF weapon optics (side-mounted thermal sight + red-dot collimator) within a 3-second forest firefight and details neighboring GRU brigade tactics.

EXPORT /pow.csv

[TIER 1: 31 FULL DOSSIERS] [TIER 2: 352 REGISTRY MATCHES] [TOTAL: 383 VERIFIED MATCHES · 0% NAMESAKES]

UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OPEN DATA (UO.XML & FOP.XML OF 2026-10-27), PROZORRO & UA NSDC SANCTIONS REGISTRY (NBU AML RESOLUTION NO. 65 / LAW NO. 1644-VII / UN CHARTER ART. 51): This section documents two structural corporate-registry and sanctions-compliance gaps across 383 100%-verified subjects (31 Tier-1 full dossiers + 352 Tier-2 consolidated registry records): (1) individuals matched via verified phones, corporate e-mails, and Tax IDs from the May 2014 “DPR” armed militant recruitment archive remain active owners, directors, and sole proprietors in Ukraine’s Unified State Register (including brand-new 2026 Kyiv companies, Prozorro public-procurement contractors, registered print media, construction, and security firms) without NSDC sanctions; (2) Russian billionaires and citizens under active 10-year Ukrainian NSDC and EU sanctions (including Svetofor / Mere, TechnoNICOL, and ex-Severstal) remain recorded as active Ultimate Beneficial Owners of unliquidated Ukrainian companies in live UO.xml.

EXPORT /edr.json [383] EU AUDIT (DG NEAR / DG FISMA): 12 EDR CLUSTERS + 15 MIRRORS [27] → METHODOLOGY M-20 (BRUSSELS RICOCHET) →

CROSS-MAPPING 2014 MILITANT ARCHIVES & NSDC / EU SANCTIONS AGAINST LIVE UKRAINIAN EDR (UO.XML / FOP.XML): TWO-TIER COMPLIANCE ARCHITECTURE (0% NAMESAKES)

Tier 1 (31 full SSR dossiers covering operating LLCs, Prozorro public-procurement contractors, and NSDC/EU-sanctioned Russian UBOs) + Tier 2 (352 compact FOP & corporate UBO records for rapid AML/KYC screening)

1. Static-Archive Blind Spot & Fresh 2026 Registrations

Without automated cross-mapping against live Ministry of Justice datasets (UO.xml and FOP.xml), compliance teams miss both long-running companies of 2014 militant applicants and brand-new LLCs and FOPs incorporated in April–September 2026 alongside Prozorro municipal contractors.

2. Strict Secondary-Key Filter (Zero-Namesake)

All surname/patronymic-only collisions were discarded. Every record is anchored by an independent secondary identifier: exact contact phone match in live EDR or Prozorro contracts (+380660824727, +380977788114, +380505656633), corporate e-mail (tne@ukr.net = LLC ‘T.N.E.’), or National Media Council Decision No. 1159 (R30-01797).

3. Sanctioned & Direct RF Capital Active in UO.xml (Law No. 1644-VII / CMU No. 187)

Direct parsing of <FOUNDER> and <BENEFICIARY> tags in the 2026-10-27 UO.xml snapshot exposed active Ukrainian companies totaling UAH 2.39B in Tier 1 and over UAH 26.7B across all 300 verified subjects, including entities linked to Rosatom (JSC TVEL), Rostec (Technopromexport), AFK Sistema, Svetofor / Mere, Guta Group, and January 2026 wartime registrations.

4. Two-Tier Structure for Banking AML/CFT (NBU Resolution No. 65)

To preserve investigative clarity, 31 high-impact corporate and sanctioned-UBO cases are published as full forensic SSR dossiers (Tier 1), while 352 additional verified FOPs and corporate UBOs are consolidated into a searchable reference table below (Tier 2) and exported in /edr.json.

[VERIFIED DATA SOURCES & TRANSPARENT PROVENANCE FOR /EDR]:

1) May 2014 Militant Network (22 subjects: 7 in Tier 1 + 15 in Tier 2): direct primary attribution to the Myrotvorets Center Database (myrotvorets.center) and the intercepted ‘DPR’ Mobilization Directorate / ‘Vostok’ Battalion archive (#4500idiotov, May 2014) with verbatim “How I can help DPR” pledges, TSV row numbers, phones, and e-mails; 2) Corporate & UBO Registry Layer (278 RF-capital subjects + all 300 records): official open-data dump of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine (UO.xml and FOP.xml as of 2026-10-27) and Prozorro (prozorro.gov.ua); 3) Sanctions Layer: Ukraine NSDC State Register of Sanctions (drs.nsdc.gov.ua), EU (EUR-Lex), US (OFAC SDN), UK, Canada, Poland, and OpenSanctions.

SUMMARY CROSS-MAPPING MATRIX OF UKRAINE'S UNIFIED STATE REGISTER (31 TIER-1 FULL DOSSIERS + 352 TIER-2 REGISTRY MATCHES = 383 VERIFIED MATCHES · SNAPSHOT AS OF 2026-10-27):

Ukrainian State Registry EDR Cross-Mapping Matrix

UNIFIED EDR OBLAST FILTER (TIER 1 + TIER 2 · ISO 3166-2:UA):

All Oblasts of Ukraine (Kyiv City separate from Kyiv Oblast; regional capitals merged into their oblasts)

[TIER 1 · FULL FORENSIC CROSS-MAPPING CARDS & SSR DOSSIERS]: PRIORITY CORPORATE ENTITIES, PROZORRO CONTRACTORS & SANCTIONED RF UBOS [31]

CASES #01–#31 · VERIFIED IN UO.XML / FOP.XML (2026-10-27)

Consolidated Searchable Registry of UA EDR Entities & Sole Proprietors (Tier 2 — 352 Verified Matches)

352 / 352

Compact searchable & filterable AML/KYC screening table across 25 regions of Ukraine: 15 active FOP & LLC records matched to the Myrotvorets Center Database / #4500idiotov (2014) + 27 NSDC/EU/OFAC-sanctioned RF subjects + 233 active companies with direct Russian corporate/UBO capital in live UO.xml (2026-10-27)

#	Subject & Region	Category & Source	Primary Record (Myrotvorets / Sanctions / UO.xml)	Active Status in Ukraine's EDR (UO.xml / FOP.xml · 2026-10-27)

[ECCLESIASTICAL-INTELLIGENCE NETWORK OF ROC / FSB · UA EDR + FNS RF EGRUL] 26 CASES · 74 ACTIVE UA EDRPOU ENTITIES · 31 SIGNED FNS RF EXTRACTS

ECCLESIASTICAL-INTELLIGENCE & PARAMILITARY NETWORK OF THE ROC / FSB IN UKRAINE, RF & EU (UA EDR + FNS RF)

Cross-registry matrix of 26 verified clusters: 74 active UOC-MP legal entities in Ukraine’s live Unified State Register (edr_live.sqlite as of 2026-10-31), Russian passports and 12-digit FNS TINs of hierarchs, 31 digitally signed FNS RF extracts (series YuE9965-...), FSB media proxies (SPZh, Pershyi Kozatskyi, Myriany), parish funding in RF/EU via Rosatom, and combat chaplains of Russian Armed Forces military units

EXPORT /en/rpts.json [26 / 74 UA EDRPOU] EXPORT CSV (Excel)

SECTOR 1 · EPARCHIES & LAVRAS IN UKRAINE [15]

74 Active UA EDRPOU Entities + SBU Verdicts

Active eparchial administrations, monasteries, and synodal departments in Ukraine’s EDR whose hierarchs hold Russian passports/TINs, reregistered eparchies in FNS RF EGRUL, or were convicted under Arts. 111 / 111-1 / 111-2 CCU.

SECTOR 2 · FSB MEDIA PROXIES [5]

SPZh · Pershyi Kozatskyi · Myriany

The largest FSB ecclesiastical-media network dismantled by the SBU in March 2024 (15+ indictments under Arts. 111, 255, 161, 436-2 CCU), whose legal entities remain active in Ukraine’s live EDR.

SECTOR 3 · ROSATOM & EU FUNDS [3]

Rosatom · MFA RF · European Parishes

Financing of Patriarchal ROC foundations, “Orthodox Initiative” grant programs, and European ROC-MP parishes via Rosatom State Corporation entities and the MFA RF Compatriots Fund.

SECTOR 4 · COMBAT CHAPLAINS OF RF UNITS [3]

Synodal Dept for RF MoD · VDV · Black Sea Fleet

Staff military chaplains of the ROC attached to VDV Airborne Divisions (v/ch 07264, 74268), the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (v/ch 13140), and paramilitary Orthodox tactical centers (“Peresvet”, “Andreevsky Krest”).

MATRIX #1: UOC-MP EPARCHIES IN LIVE UKRAINIAN EDR (74 EDRPOU), RF PASSPORTS/TINS & SBU-EXPOSED MEDIA PROXIES

MATRIX #2: SIGNED FNS RF EGRUL EXTRACTS (31 DIGITALLY SIGNED PDFS), ROSATOM FUNDS IN RF/EU & COMBAT CHAPLAINS OF RF UNITS

Showing: 26 of 26 cases (74 UA EDRPOU)

Amsterdam's BGP Router for Iskanders and Rostec: How RIPE NCC (KvK 40539632) Dismisses 90.12% of Sanctions Alerts and Signs RPKI ROAs for Russian VPK and Occupied Melitopol Telecom

1. The Myth of the 'Sovereign Runet' and the Building at Stationsplein 11 in Amsterdam

2. Mathematical Verdict from RIPE NCC's Own Disclosure: Inside Document RIPE-868 (Q4 2026)

3. How Table 2 of RIPE-868 Mathematically Proves that Rostec, Rosatom, UAC, and VGTRK Pools Remain Unfrozen

4. Cryptographic RPKI ROAs Signed by RIPE NCC Root: TsNIIMash Missile Institute, Russian MoD Broadcaster Zvezda, and Occupied Melitopol Telecom

CERTIFIED REGISTRY OF IDENTIFIED GRU BOTS, BATCH AUTOREGS & NETWORK IDENTIFIERS

SPECIAL OSINT INVESTIGATIONS & NETWORK FORENSICS

INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY-CHAIN MATRIX: RUSSIAN WEAPON SYSTEM → 4 FACTORY TIERS (EXECUTIVES & CONTACTS)

RUSSIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY SANCTIONS COMPLIANCE RADAR ([UA-NSDC] · [US-OFAC] · [EU] · [UK]) & SANCTIONS GAPS

OPEN RUSSIAN SBP PHONES (+7 9...) & TELEGRAM @HANDLES OF Z-CHANNELS AND UAV/EW PROCUREMENT FUNDS

VERIFICATION METHODOLOGY: RUSSIAN POW DECEPTION PATTERNS & TECHNICAL INCONSISTENCIES

CROSS-MAPPING 2014 MILITANT ARCHIVES & NSDC / EU SANCTIONS AGAINST LIVE UKRAINIAN EDR (UO.XML / FOP.XML): TWO-TIER COMPLIANCE ARCHITECTURE (0% NAMESAKES)

[TIER 1 · FULL FORENSIC CROSS-MAPPING CARDS & SSR DOSSIERS]: PRIORITY CORPORATE ENTITIES, PROZORRO CONTRACTORS & SANCTIONED RF UBOS [31]

Consolidated Searchable Registry of UA EDR Entities & Sole Proprietors (Tier 2 — 352 Verified Matches)

ECCLESIASTICAL-INTELLIGENCE & PARAMILITARY NETWORK OF THE ROC / FSB IN UKRAINE, RF & EU (UA EDR + FNS RF)

OPERATIONAL CHRONICLE & RUSSIAN STATE MEDIA RADAR

RUSSIAN STATE MEDIA CITATION ARCHIVE (ROSSIYA SEGODNYA · UKRAINA.RU · LENTA.RU · TASS)

TRADECRAFT & METHODS: ENGINEERING HYGIENE, BOT DETECTION & PSYOP ANATOMY

SLIPOTA VIDOMSTV: ZhIVIY LIChILNIK REAKTsIYi DERZhAVNIKh ORGANIV, ZAKhIDNIKh REGULYaTORIV TA AUDITORIV

INDUSTRIAL RUSSIAN BOTFARM MATRIX & MEDIA SYNDICATION GRAPH

CLASSIFICATION OF 6 INDUSTRIAL RUSSIAN BOTFARMS: TECHNICAL SIGNATURES & SERVICED CHANNELS

PER-SPEAKER BOTFARM & RUSSIAN STATE MEDIA LINKAGE REGISTRY

Amsterdam's BGP Router for Iskanders and Rostec: How RIPE NCC (KvK 40539632) Dismisses 90.12% of Sanctions Alerts and Signs RPKI ROAs for Russian VPK and Occupied Melitopol Telecom

1. The Myth of the 'Sovereign Runet' and the Building at Stationsplein 11 in Amsterdam

2. Mathematical Verdict from RIPE NCC's Own Disclosure: Inside Document RIPE-868 (Q4 2026)

3. How Table 2 of RIPE-868 Mathematically Proves that Rostec, Rosatom, UAC, and VGTRK Pools Remain Unfrozen

4. Cryptographic RPKI ROAs Signed by RIPE NCC Root: TsNIIMash Missile Institute, Russian MoD Broadcaster Zvezda, and Occupied Melitopol Telecom

CERTIFIED REGISTRY OF IDENTIFIED GRU BOTS, BATCH AUTOREGS & NETWORK IDENTIFIERS

SPECIAL OSINT INVESTIGATIONS & NETWORK FORENSICS

INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY-CHAIN MATRIX: RUSSIAN WEAPON SYSTEM → 4 FACTORY TIERS (EXECUTIVES & CONTACTS)

RUSSIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY SANCTIONS COMPLIANCE RADAR ([UA-NSDC] · [US-OFAC] · [EU] · [UK]) & SANCTIONS GAPS

OPEN RUSSIAN SBP PHONES (+7 9...) & TELEGRAM @HANDLES OF Z-CHANNELS AND UAV/EW PROCUREMENT FUNDS

VERIFICATION METHODOLOGY: RUSSIAN POW DECEPTION PATTERNS & TECHNICAL INCONSISTENCIES

CROSS-MAPPING 2014 MILITANT ARCHIVES & NSDC / EU SANCTIONS AGAINST LIVE UKRAINIAN EDR (UO.XML / FOP.XML): TWO-TIER COMPLIANCE ARCHITECTURE (0% NAMESAKES)

[TIER 1 · FULL FORENSIC CROSS-MAPPING CARDS & SSR DOSSIERS]: PRIORITY CORPORATE ENTITIES, PROZORRO CONTRACTORS & SANCTIONED RF UBOS [31]

Consolidated Searchable Registry of UA EDR Entities & Sole Proprietors (Tier 2 — 352 Verified Matches)

ECCLESIASTICAL-INTELLIGENCE & PARAMILITARY NETWORK OF THE ROC / FSB IN UKRAINE, RF & EU (UA EDR + FNS RF)

OPERATIONAL CHRONICLE & RUSSIAN STATE MEDIA RADAR

RUSSIAN STATE MEDIA CITATION ARCHIVE (ROSSIYA SEGODNYA · UKRAINA.RU · LENTA.RU · TASS)

TRADECRAFT & METHODS: ENGINEERING HYGIENE, BOT DETECTION & PSYOP ANATOMY

SLIPOTA VIDOMSTV: ZhIVIY LIChILNIK REAKTsIYi DERZhAVNIKh ORGANIV, ZAKhIDNIKh REGULYaTORIV TA AUDITORIV

INDUSTRIAL RUSSIAN BOTFARM MATRIX & MEDIA SYNDICATION GRAPH

CLASSIFICATION OF 6 INDUSTRIAL RUSSIAN BOTFARMS: TECHNICAL SIGNATURES & SERVICED CHANNELS

PER-SPEAKER BOTFARM & RUSSIAN STATE MEDIA LINKAGE REGISTRY

SUBMIT VERIFICATION LEAD

COMPLIANCE & CONTACT DESK